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CHAPTER 10 
Consumer Law ' 
WILLIAM F. WILLIER 
§1O.1. Introduction. During the 1972 SURVEY year the MassachuseU& 
General Court again demonstrated its concern for consumer problems, 
while the Supreme Judicial Court, even with new members, continued 
to exhibit its historical conservatism. In legislative activity, there was no 
grand design for' resolution of consumer problems. There was, however, 
further activity in the field of consumer credit, in which Massachusetts 
has become the national leader in the protection of consumer interests. 
Real estate interests also came in for new scrutiny under the Consumer 
Protection Act,1 which was amended specifically to include real estate 
transactions as they affect consumers. Perhaps the year is as significant 
for the bills filed and not enacted as it is for the bills that were enacted 
into law. The following analysis attempts to include both to the extent 
that they lend themselves to a logical delineation. 
§1O.2. Credit cards: Issuance, charges and liability. Since they were 
first introducd by American Express, "three-party credit cards"-those 
used to obtain goods, services or money from someone other than the 
issuer-have steadily grown in acceptance by consumers. Several oil 
companies are now allowing their cards to be used with non-affiliated 
companies. The gasoline credit card of one oil company may thus be 
honored at the service station of a non-affiliated company or used to 
purchase unrelated services such as hotel accommodations. And, after 
attempting to promote more cumbersome devices such as check credit, 
commercial banks plunged into the credit card arena in the 1960's with 
Bank Americard and Master Charge. Clearly, such enterprises were 
designed to compete with those retailers who issued two-party cards 
which could only be used at the issuer's establishments. 
During the 1972 SURVEY year, the legislature passed new laws affecting 
the three-party credit card industry. One of these enactments, Chapter 
381 of the Acts of 1972, amending Chapter 168 of the General Laws, 
adds savings banks to the list of institutions permitted to issue three-party 
credit cards. No doubt the savings banks will take advantage of this new 
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privilege.1 When they do, Massachusetts consumers can expect to receive 
another flood of inducements to acquire still more credit cards,2 since, 
as the commercial banks have learned, only volume produces profit. Yet, 
careless mailing and selection of holders may lead to the unauthorized 
and imprudent use of credit, ultimately resulting in great financial loss 
to the issuer. 
An equally significant development is Chapter 783 of the Acts of 
1972 which clarifies the law regarding maximum interest rates and 
billing periods for the credit card business. Prior to the effective date 
of this act, it had been a matter of dispute between three-party credit 
card issuers and consumer advocates whether the finance charge ceilings 
applicable to three-party credit cards were those under the Small Loans 
Act3 or those under the Retail Instalment Sales Act4 which includes re-
volving charge accounts. Truth in lending requirements also differed 
accordingly. Chapter 783 now treats extensions of credit under a three-
party credit card as loans with separate interest rate ceilings: one and 
one-half percent per month on an unpaid balance of five hundred dollars 
or less, and one percent per month on any balance which exceeds five 
hundred dollars.5 The change will force most issuers to adjust their pre-
viously imposed finance rates by making them comply with the five 
hundred dollar breaking point and/or reducing them to meet the statu-
torily imposed rate ceilings. This may cause savings banks and other 
segments of the credit card industry to reevaluate their participation in 
the credit card business. 
Chapter 783 applies to any "open end credit"6 or revolving credit 
§ 10.2. 1 Even though computer companies are now experienced in such ac-
tivity, the cost to banks of initiating a credit card program is extremely high; 
therefore, as a practical matter, savings banks will first have to make a very serious 
financial risk determination. 
2 The direct issuance, however, of an unsolicted credit card is proscribed by 
G.L., c. 255, § 12E (2), which provides that, except in cases of renewal or sub-
stitution, "[n]o credit card shall be issued except in response to a request or ap-
plication therefor." 
3 G.L., c. 140, §96 (loan ceiling of $3,000). The following maximum interest 
rates were set by the Small Loans Regulatory Board under the authority granted 
to it by Acts of 1962, c. 795, §4: 
(1) 2~ % per month on the unpaid principal balance not exceeding $200 (30% 
annual' percentage rate) ; 
(2) 2% per month on that part of the unpaid principal balance exceeding $200 
but not exceeding $600 (24% annual percentage rate); 
(3) 1 % % per month on that part of the unpaid principal balance exceeding 
$600 but not exceeding $1,000 (21 % annual percentage rate); 
(4) %% per month on that part of the unpaid principal balance exceeding $1,000 
(9% annual percentage rate) ; 
(5) ~ % per month on the unpaid principal balance 12 months after the original 
date of maturity (6% annual percentage rate). 
4 G.L., c. 255D, § 11 (10% maximum annual interest rate on first $500; 8 % 
on amounts exceeding $500). 
5 Acts of 1972, c. 783, §1, adding G.L., c. 140, §1l4B. 
6 G.L., c. 140C, § 1 (r) defines "open end credit" as: 
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transaction and not only to credit card transactions. It prescribes two 
alternate and exclusive methods for calculating finance charges,7 each 
of which may have a different impact on the consumer. Under the "ad-
justed balance" method the finance charge is computed at the beginning 
of the billing cycle on the customer's previous balance, i.e. that amount 
due and payable. Before the finance charge is computed the customer's 
account must be credited by deducting all payments on accounts, returns 
and other credits made or given during the prior billing cycle. However, 
a deduction for a return or other credit is permitted only to the extent 
that the purchase to which the return or credit relates has been reflected 
in the previous balance. Thus, the purchase made and returned during 
the new billing cycle does not have to be deducted since it is not reflected 
as a charge in the balance at the beginning. The debit-credit items would 
be reflected in the next balance. This method is advantageous to the 
debtor who can avoid a finance charge by paying off his entire previous 
balance before the finance charge is calculated. The "average daily 
balance," practicably calculable only by creditors with access to com-
puters, adds the balance for each day (which will reflect credits) and 
applies the finance charge rate to the average. If the creditor utilizes 
this method, there will always be a finance charge so long as there was 
a balance on any day during the billing period. However, the practice 
of some creditors of assessing a finance charge against the previous 
balance without taking credits into account is now prohibited. 
The liability of a cardholder for the unauthorized use of his lost or 
stolen credit card is limited by both MassachusettsB and federal9 law. 
Additionally, if certain statutorily prescribed conditions are not met, the 
holder may sustain no liability at all. 10 Recent judicial authority also 
appears to have made new inroads on the issue of the liability of a card-
holder for the unauthorized use of his credit card. 
. . . consumer credit extended on an account pursuant to a plan under 
which (1) the creditor may permit the customer to make purchases or obtain 
loans, from time to time, directly from the creditor or indirectly by use of a 
credit card, check or other device, as the pllln may provide; (2) the cus-
tomer has the privilege of paying the balance in full or in instalments; and 
(3) a finance charge may be computed by the creditor, from time to time, 
on an outstanding unpaid balance. The term does not include negotiated 
advances under an open end real estate mortgage or a letter of credit. 
7 Acts of 1972, c. 783, §§2, 3, inserting G.L., c. 140C, §6B and amending G.L., 
c.255D, §27 (3), respectively. 
B G.L., c. 255, § 12E. This statute was first enacted as Acts of 1968, c. 394, 
which is discussed briefly in 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.30. The law was 
subsequently amended by Acts of 1970, c. 665 (fully analyzed in 1970 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §9.8), and by Acts of 1971, c. 712, which, inter alia, placed 
the maximum liability at $50. 
9 Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §1643 (1968) ($50 
maximum liability). 
10 Regardless of the date on which the card was issued, a holder will not be 
liable for the unauthorized use of his card unless "the card is an accepted card 
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Lechmere Tire and Sales Co. v. Burwick11 involved a situation in which 
the missing credit card of the defendant had been used by an unknown 
party to make fifteen unauthorized purchases totaling $611.78. The 
plaintiff-company sought to recover that amount from the defendant 
under the terms of the credit agreement, and was successful in the lower 
courts. The Supreme Judicial Court, however, determined that, irrespec-
tive of any clause imposing liability in an "adhesion" contract, the test 
of liability in this case revolved around the question of whether the 
plaintiff's employees used due care in preventing the use of the credit 
card by imposters, not merely whether they acted in good faith.1 2 Finding 
that "the evidence warrant[ed] the conclusion that Lechmere was negli-
gent in failing to make any comparison of the signature on the card with 
the signatures on the sales slips," the Court ruled that "the issue of 
Lechmere's due care must be decided by the trier of fact."13 A new 
trial was ordered. 
Although the transactions in Burwick took place in 1967, one year 
prior to the enactment of the Massachusetts credit card statute discussed 
above, the Court cited the recent statutory authority as indicative of the 
trend of public policy in the area of consumer protection. 14 Since it is 
highly doubtful that either the Massachusetts or federal law was intended 
to completely supplant judicially imposed obligations upon credit card 
issuers, the duty of due care sanctioned by the Supreme Judicial Court 
no doubt supplements those duties and proscriptions imposed by statute. 
Thus, a credit card holder may escape even the limited liability allowed 
by the statutes if he can establish that the issuer was negligent in honor-
ing a card presented by an unauthorized user. 
§1O.3. Credit: Definition; criteria. The meaning of "credit," as an 
abstract legal concept, has been the subject of much debate over the 
years. While the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code1 failed 
to define the term, Congress filled the gap with the Truth-In-Lending 
[as defined in G.L., c. 255, § 12E (1)], the liability is not in excess of fifty dollars, 
the card issuer gives adequate notice to the cardholder of the potential liabil'ity, 
the card issuer has provided the cardholder with a self-addressed, prestamped 
notification to be mailed by the cardholder in the event of the loss or theft of 
the credit ,card, . . . the unauthorized use occurs before the. cardholder has noti-
fied the card issuer. . . . [and] the card issuer has provided a method whereby 
the user of such card can be identified as the person authorized to use it." G.L., 
c. 255, §12E(3). 
11 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 19, 277 N.E.2d 503. 
12 Id. at 21-23, 277 N.E.2d at 506-507. 
13 Id. at 23, 277 N.E.2d at 507. 
14 It is interesting to note that the testimony of Attorney Jerald D. Burwick, 
the defendant in the case, before the Joint Committee on Commerce and Labor 
in 1968 was likely to have been the key factor in getting the bill through the 
legislature. 
§ 10.3. 1 The Uniform Commercial Code was enacted in Massachusetts by 
Acts of 1957, c. 765, amending G.L., c. 106. 
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Act of 1968. The Act defines "credit" as "the right granted by a creditor 
to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its pay-
ment."2 The term "creditor," however, "refers only to creditors who 
regularly extend, or arrange for the extension of, credit for which the 
payment of a finance charge is required . ... "3 (Emphasis added). In 
addition, the disclosure of credit terms required by the Act must be made 
to "each person to whom consumer credit is extended and upon whom a 
finance charge is or may be imposed . ... "4 (Emphasis added). It would 
thus appear that only those extensions of credit to which a finance charge 
is applied would be covered by the Federal Truth-In-Lending Act. 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, pursuant to 
its regulatory authority under the Truth-In-Lending Act,5 has defined 
the scope of the Act to include any transaction which is payable in more 
than four instalments, whether or not a finance charge is separately im-
posed, or one upon which a finance charge is or may be imposed.6 In 
adding the "four instalment" alternative, the Board recognized that no 
consumer creditor would e~end finance-free credit since there are 
necessarily costs involved in administering a credit transaction. If such 
costs are not specifically called "finance charges," it is likely that they 
are built into the price of the goods and services or other charges. To 
mitigate ·the effect of its definition on simple, short-term transactions, 
the Board wrote in the "more than four instalments" limitation. 
Reading the disclosure requirements of the Federal Truth-In-Lending 
Act in a more narrow and less commercially realistic way, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently held in the 
case of Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.' that the Board 
overstepped its authority in promulgating its four instalment rule.8 The 
case will be heard by the United States Supreme Court which has granted 
certiorari,9 and Senator Proxmire, the sponsor of the original truth~in-
2 15 U.S.C. §1602(e) (1968). 
3 Id. at §1602(f). "Creditor" is also defined in the U.C.C.: "'Creditor' in-
cludes a general creditor, a secured creditor, a lien creditor and any representa-
tive of creditors, including an assignee for the benefit of creditors, a trustee in 
bankruptcy, a receiver in equity and an executor or .administrator of an insolvent 
debtor's or assignor's estate." G.L., c. 106, §1-201 (12). 
4 15 U.S.C. §I631(a) (1968). 
5 Id. at 11604. 
6 Regulation Z §226.2(k). Regulation Z (12 CFR §§226.1-226.12) encompasses 
those regulations promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System under the authority of Title I (Truth-In-Lending Act) of the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §I601 et seq. (1968». 
, 449 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted 405 U.S. 987. (1972). 
8 449 F.2d 235, 241. The Court of Appeals also held that the "four instalment 
rule" was unconstitutional as a violation of the Fifth Amendment in that the rule 
creates a conclusive or irrebutable presumption that the price paid by the con-
iumer in such transactions includes the cost of extending credit. Id. at 242. 
9 405 U.S. 987 (1972). 
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lending bill, has introduced legislation which would make it clear that 
the Board's rule was in fact authorized by the Act.10 
The Massachusetts Truth-In-Lending Lawll specifically adopts a form 
of the four instalment rule in defining transactions to which the statute 
applies.l2 The applicability of state disclosure requirements to many 
Massachusetts credit transactions is therefore fairly clear despite the 
controversy over the federal law since transactions subject to Massachu-
setts law are exempt from the requirements of the Federal Act.13 How-
ever, consumer credit transactions of certain institutions including feder-
ally chartered banks are subject to the federal rather than the state 
truth-in-Iending requirements.l4 While the Mourning decision remains 
in effect, disclosure may be required in some Massachusetts transactions 
involving more than four instalments and not in others.15 
Regardless of how "credit" is defined for a given legal purpose, the 
qualifications that a consumer must meet to receive that credit are by 
and large left to the discretion of creditors. Over the years, various seg-
ments of the consumer credit industry have established different standards 
for qualifying consumers as eligible to receive credit. Due to the lack of 
uniformity of these qualifying criteria the standards applied by any 
given creditor may be highly subjective and, in some instances, dis-
criminatory. The legislature is now beginning to take steps to alleviate 
this problem. Specifically, the General Court has determined that it is 
an "unlawful practice" for retailers to refuse to extend credit to a person 
solely because he or she is sixty-two years of age or 01der.16 Since this 
proscription reaches only retailers, it may be asked whether other classes 
of creditors are still free to discriminate on the basis of old age. Under 
the amended statute, "[t]he term 'unlawful practice' includes only those 
unlawful practices specified [therein]."17 (Emphasis added). A bill which 
was introduced to prevent credit discrimination on the basis of man-tal 
status and sex18 was not enacted.19 
§lOA. Credit: Truth-in-Iending. The truth-in-Iending provisions of 
10 S. 652, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1972). 
11 G.L., c. HOC. 
12 Id. at §1(j). 
13 15 U.S.C. §1633 (1968). 
14 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,435 (1819). 
15 If the constitutional basis for the Mourning decision is sustained by the 
Supreme Court, such determination will not adversely affect the status of the four 
instalment rule in Massachusetts. The rule will remain valid since it was statutorily 
imposed rather than added by regulation as was the federal rule. Thus, as regards 
the Massachusetts rule, the question of "conclusive presumption" will be fore-
closed. 
16 Acts of 1972, c. 542, adding G.L., c. 151B, §4(12). 
17 G.L., c. 151B, §lA. 
18 Cf. G.L., c. 151B, §3B (making it unlawful for a creditor to discriminate on 
the basis of sex in a mortgage transaction). 
19 H. 6282 (1972). 
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the General Laws1 have been amended2 to bring them into conformity 
with amendments to Regula:tion Z made by the Federal Reserve Board.s 
While some of the a:mendments might be viewed as "clean-up" provisions, 
clarifying more or less minor points,4 others are more substantive in na-
ture. 
Under the former law, a creditor was required to mail or deliver to a 
buyer a notice of change in credit terms under an open end credit plan,5 
such as a revolving charge account, thirty days before the chang-e became 
effective or thirty days prior to the beginning of the next billing cycle, 
whichever came sooner.6 To avoid the cost of a mailing separate from 
a regular monthly billing, the change would have had to have been de-
cided upon at least two billing periods prior to its becoming effective. 
By ana:mendment to that law, the required notice need be sent only 
fifteen days prior to the beginning of the billing period in which the 
change is to become effective, and no notice at all is required if the only 
change is to be a reduction in payments, rates or minimum charges.7 
Unanswered is the question of how changes made unilaterally by the 
creditor can bind a customer who has not agreed to them, especially since 
the a:mended chapter speaks in terms of a revolving credit "agreement."s 
The argument might be made that absent such an agreement, the change 
is ineffective notwithstanding the notice which could be construed as no 
more than an invitation to a customer to enter into such an agreement. 
Also within the purview of the federal and state truth-in-Iending laws 
is the practice of the merchant who quotes a certain price for his goods 
or services but will accept a lesser amount to induce prompt payment.9 
The customer who makes his payment after the expiration of the "dis-
count" period pays what a:mounts to a finance charge. While consumers 
may not have viewed it in that way, this practice resembles an instalment 
sale transaction. Such discount transactions are subject to the disclosure 
provisions of the truth-in-Iending laws unless expressly exempted, as are 
bills from utilities regulated by state or federal agencies.10 
An a:mendment to the Massachusetts Truth-In-Lending Law permits 
§lOA·. 1 G.L., c. 1400 and G.L., 255D, 127. 
2 Acts of 1972, c. 229. 
3 See §to.3, note 6, supra. 
4 For example, c. 1400 was amended to allow creditors to ignore the twenty-
ninth day in February every four years in calculating and disclosing ~uch items <),3 
finance charge, payment, and percentage rate. Acts of 1972, c. 229, §1, amending 
G.L., c. 1400, §5 by inserting subsection (i). Another example of a clean-up 
provision is the. amendment which permits a creditor to substitute prescribed 
language for the word "home" in the notice to rescind a security interest in real 
property which does not include a dwelling. Id. at 15, amending G.L., 1400, 
§8(b). 
5 "Open end credit" is defined in §to.2, note 6, supra. 
6 Acts of 1969, c. 517, 153, amending G.L., c. 225D. §27E. 
7 Acts of 1972, c. 229, §to amending G.L., 225D §27E. 
S The language of "agreement" appears in G.L., c. 255D, §§27B and 270. 
9 Regullation Z, 12 CFR 1226.8(0); G.L., c. 140C, 17(0). . 
10 G.L., c. 140e, §2(d). 
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some deviation from the disclosures otherwise required where a discount 
transaction is involved. The creditor must disclose on the invoice or 
other evidence of sale (1) the date of the sale or invoice; (2) the rate 
of discount, the periods within which the discount may be taken and the 
dates on which the full amount of the obligation is due and payable; 
(3) the amount or the method of computing the amount of any default 
or similar late payment charges; (4) a description of the type of any 
security interest to be held by the creditor in connection with the exten~ 
sion of credit and a clear identification of the property to which the 
security interest relates; (5) the amount of the discount, designated 
specifically as a "finance charge;" and (6) the "annual percentage rate," 
(using that term) for any discount exceeding five percent of the obliga-
tion to which the discount relates. l1 
The disclosure requirement for default charges should be read with 
another rule promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board which explains 
that a delinquency or default charge is not a finance charge requiring 
disclosure, but becomes such if the creditor continues to extend credit, 
adding such charges to the debtor's account following the nonpayment 
of balances previously due and payable.12 
Conforming to the federal truth-in-Iending provisions, the Massachu-
setts law provides that the disclosure of discount need be made only once, 
usually on the sales slip, if a debt is charged to an open end account. 
The discount need not be included in the finance charge or annual per-
centage rate calculated on the account itself. IS This provision further 
distorts disclosures in open end accounts, but the Federal Reserve Board 
appears to have sacrificed accuracy for simplicity and expediency. For 
transactions which are not open ended, the discount must be deducted 
from the price and added to any other finance charge in computing the 
annual percentage rate if the debtor may make more than one payment.14 
This method more accurately reflects the true annual percentage rate. 
If the debt is payable in only one payment, however, the discount may 
be ignored in computing and disclosing the cash price, finance charge, 
and annual percentage rate. IS To make things still easier for merchants 
giving discounts, the Massachusetts law permits the required disclosures 
to be made after the consummation of the transaction.16 
The financial affairs of farmers who frequently live from crop to crop 
and from herd to herd may be erratic as compared to those of other 
businessmen. It is, therefore, understandable that agricultural creditors 
have difficulty determining finance charges and annual percentage rates 
when such payments are dependent upon the farmer's growing or harvest 
11 Acts of 1972, c. 229, §3, adding G.L., c. 140 C, §7(o) (1). 
12 Federal Reserve Board Interpretation, 12 CFR §226.401. 
13 Acts of 1972, c. 229, §3, adding G.L., c. 140C, §7(o) (6). 
14 Id., adding G.L., c. 140C, §7(o) (7). 
IS Id. 
16 Id., adding G.L., c. 140C, §7(o) (8). "Consummation" is that point in time 
when a contractual relationship is created. Regulation Z, 12 CFR §226.2(cc). 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/13
270 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §10.5 
season or other operational factors. Nevertheless, such credit transactions 
are within the purview of both the federal and state truth-in-Iending 
laws,17 To alleviate the problem for those who extend credit to farmers 
and for agricultural purposes generally, the state disclosure requirements 
have been somewhat relaxed in situations where credit terms are difficult 
to compute in advance due to fluctuating operational factors. ls The prin-
cipal exceptions permitted where such a credit transaction is involved is 
that the method of computing the finance charge, rather than the dollar 
amount of such charge, may be disclosed and that the annual percentage 
rate need not be disclosed.!9 Furthermore, the number, amount, and due 
dates or periods of payments scheduled Ito repay the indebtedness need 
be disclosed only if these items are determinable at the time the disclosures 
are required to be made.2o 
§1O.5. Debt collection: Due process: Wage exceptions. Massachu-
setts has long been notorious throughout the country for legally sanction-
ing the creditor practice of commencing civil actions against defaulting 
debtors by tying up the defendant's property, with virtually no procedural 
safeguards, by writs of attachment or trustee process.! A defendant could 
thus be deprived of the money in his bank account and other property 
essential to his health and welfare without any judicial determination 
of his liability or advance notice of ,the attachment. During the 1972 
SURVEY year these statutes were finally challenged on constitutional 
grounds and the federal district court for Massachusetts ruled that trustee 
process infringes the Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee. 
In Schneider u. Margossian,2 the plaintiff had been sued in state court 
under the trustee process attachment procedure;3 his bank account was 
attached without notice or opportunity to be heard. The plaintiff then 
sought injunctive relief in federal district court alleging the unconstitu-
tionality of the statutes permitting such attachments. Relying upon the 
much heralded Supreme Court decisions of Sniadach u. Family Finance 
17 Both acts include regulation of credit extended for agricultural purposes as 
\\ell as for strictly consumer purposes. Regulation Z, 12 CFR §226.8(p); Acts 
of 1972, c. 229, §4, adding G.L., c. 140C, §7 (p). 
1S Acts of 1972, c. 229, §4 amending G.L., c. 140C, §7 (p). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
§10.5. 1 "Under [the attachment] procedure, the plaintiff simply fil1s in the 
blanks on a writ, averring that the defendant is liable to him for a certain amount 
on a particular cause of action; the writ then directs the appropriate officer to 
attach the property of the defendant, either in the defendant's hands or . . . 
in the hands of a trustee. Mass. G.L. c. 223, §16. Whether the goods are at-
tached in the defendant's or the trustee's hands is immaterial: the property is 
held to 'satisfy such judgment as the plaintiff may recover,' c. 223, §42; see also 
c. 246, §20, unless the defendant has the attachment dissolved by posting bond, 
c. 223, §120." Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741, 743 (D. Mass. 1972). 
2 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972). 
3 G.L., c. 246. 
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Corp.4 and Fuentes v. Shevin)5 the court agreed with the plaintiff's con-
tention that the Massachusetts trustee process law was a violation of due 
process and made the following observation: 
[TJrustee process may work a substantial hardship on defendants by 
... freezing their bank accounts and forcing them to borrow money 
in order to live. Not all trustee process actions may have this result, 
but what is important is that the statutes are not drafted to preclude 
this possibility.6 
The court went on to specifically enjoin the enforcement of the trustee 
process statutes to the extent that they denied defendants notice and a 
hearing prior to prejudgment attachments by means of trustee process. 
As if anticipating the Schneider decision, the General Court in Chap-
ter 179 of the Acts of 19727 provided that attachments of the defendant's 
real property must be dissolved unless notice is in fact served on the de-
fendant, as the court directs, within 60 days of commencement of the 
action. Attachments must also be dissolved if the action upon which 
they are based is not filed within 35 days.8 It is highly doubtful, however, 
that either of these provisions comports with Schneider) which found 
that an attachment must be preceded by notice and a hearing to be 
constitutional. Since the new enactments provide that notice need only 
be given after the attachment and make no provision allowing the de-
fendant to contest the matter, it would appear that they lack necessary 
elements of due process and are, therefore, constitutionally defective. 
Under another 1972 enactment the amount of gross wages exempt 
from attachment was raised from $100 to $125 per week, and an exemp-
tion of $100 per week was created for income from pensions.9 No logical 
reason for the difference in amounts is apparent since the social policy 
is the same in both cases. The Federal Wage Exemption Law continues 
to apply, exempting three quarters of disposable earnings (wages after 
taxes and the like) from the attachment.10 In any event, since under the 
Schneider decision trustee process under Massachusetts law is unconstitu-
tional insofar as it denies defendants notice and a hearing prior to pre-
judgment attachment, the exemption is irrelevant except as it applies to 
a levy of execution following a judgment.H 
§1O.6. Unfair and deceptive practices: Remedies. Few of the in-
dustries which provide important goods or services to Massachusetts 
4 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (overturning Wisconsin statute which allowed a 
creditor to garnish the wages of his alleged debtor prior to a hearing as violative 
of due process). 
5 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (broadening Sniadach rule to apply to all property of 
the defendant and not only his wages). The Fuentes decision is discussed at 
§6.12, supra. 
6 349 F. Supp. 741, 745. 
7 Acts of 1972, c. 179, § 1, amending G.L., c. 223, § 115A. 
8 Id. at §2, adding G.L., c. 223, § 115B. 
9 Acts of 1972, c. 174, amending G.L., c. 246, §28. 
10 15 U.S.C. §1673(a) (1) (1968). 
11 For a discussion of the prospective effect of the Schneider decision see §6.13, 
supra. 
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consumers escape some form of regulation by federal, state or local 
law. Much of that regulation is provided through administrative agencies 
which are specially constituted to make and enforce the rules which will 
govern a particular industry. Intricate procedures are established to 
ensure that the affected industry receives due process in the' course of 
its regulation.! For some industries, such as utilities, insurance companies, 
and common carriers, in which the competition of the marketplace is 
not sufficient to keep prices down, regulatory agencies are empowered 
to regulate the prices or rates at which goods or services may be sold. 
The rate setting procedures are particularly cumbersome, time-consuming 
and costly, and they tend to favor the regulated industry which can 
maintain a full time advocacy system. 
By and large, the regulatory agencies are empowered to act only on 
behalf of the public and not on behalf of individual consumers. There 
is virtually no legally established way by which an individual consumer 
can obtain monetary redress through resort to such an agency. The 
agency can only,. as a courtesy to the consumer, urge the industry to 
refund overcharges and the like under the threat of public action or 
enforcement. It was clearly with this need in mind that the legislature 
enacted Chapter 93A which provides, in Section 9, private remedies to 
consumers who are victims of unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and 
public remedies through the Attorney General, independent of action 
which a regulatory agency may take. 
Unfortunately, by Justice Braucher's opinion in Gordon v. Hardware 
Mutual Casualty Co.,2 the Supreme Judicial Court has held that the 
remedies of Chapter 93A are not so independent of agency action as had 
been supposed. The plaintiff in Gordon sought relief from the imposition 
of an automobile insurance premium levied by the defendant in 1970. 
For several years prior to the one in question, the defendant insurance 
company had sought and been granted permission from the Commissioner 
of Insurance to reduce the manual rates set by the Commissioner and 
pass such discounts on to the defendant's subscribers. The plaintiff, who 
had for several years purchased insurance from the defendant at the re-
duced rates, was not notified that the defendant had planned to dis-
continue the discount on his 1970 automobile policy. He learned of the 
change only when he received the written policy reflecting higher pre-
miums, at which time the new policy was already in effect. Not wishing 
to suffer a loss due to short rates on cancellation, the plaintiff did not 
cancel his policy but sought a reimbursement under Section 9 of Chapter 
93A. The Court held that ·the plaintiff was required to seek relief through 
the Commissioner of Insurance before resorting to the remedies provided 
under the Consumer Protection Act. 
It is not at all clear that the plaintiff could have obtained a rebate 
if he had resorted to the administrative procedure provided in the in-
§lO.6. 1 G.L.,c. 30A (Administrative Procedure Act). 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 281 N.E.2d 573. 
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surance regulation statutes.3 Although ,the insurance laws, at the time 
of the alleged unfair practice, provided "any person aggrieved by the 
application of its rating system" with a right to petition for review,4 and 
further provided the Commissioner with a prerogative to investigate 
unfair or deceptive practices and to seek an injunction through the At-
torney General,5 such remedies are designed exclusively to vindicate the 
public interest. The plaintiff was not aggrieved by the rate setting system 
and he did not want an injunction. The cost in time and money of using 
such indirect procedures would be prohibitive when weighed against the 
relatively small amount of the claim. Nevertheless the Court summarily 
dismissed the problem, noting simply that "[ w]e should not pass upon 
such questions without having the benefit of a prior determination by 
the commissioner [that the act or practice in question is unfair or de-
ceptive]."6 That holding effectively deprives consumers of their private 
remedies under Chapter 93A insofar as their claims relate to practices 
which may be regulated by the Commissioner of Insurance. 
Throwing salt into the plaintiff's wound, the Court invoked the man-
date of an exclusionary provision of Chapter 93A which exempts from 
that Act "transactions or actions otherwise permitted under laws as ad-
ministered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory 
authority of the commonwealth .... "7 In fact, another provision of the 
chapter expressly provides that the burden of proving the exemption falls 
upon the person claiming the exemption.S The Court unduly favored 
the defendant by invoking the exemption clause without regard to his 
burden of proof, and by requiring the plaintiff to resort to administrative 
remedies when the scheme of Chapter 93A was thereby frustrated. The 
question might rightly be asked why the burden of proving exemption 
was explicitly set forth by the legislature and whether it should be so 
readily disregarded by a court. The burden of proof provision was not 
inserted disingenuously by the legislature, and it does not leave the courts 
free to declare an exemption when the person who should claim the 
exemption has failed to do so. Such a reading would make the claim of 
exemption provision a hollow and easily cracked shell. Rather, the pro-
vision should be read to encourage "circumvention" of the administrative 
procedure for consumers where an alternate, simpler and more complete 
remedial procedure is available under Chapter 93A. 
Since a practice or act which is unfair or deceptive is unlawful under 
both Chapter 93A9 and 176D,10 the central issue in choosing a forum is 
the relative competence of the Commissioner of Insurance and the judicial 
3 G.L., cc. 174A-178. 
4 G.L., c. 175A, § 11. 
5 Acts of 1947, c. 659 (repealed and replaced by Acts of 1972, c. 543, §1). 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 761, 281 N.E.2d 573, 576. 
7 G.L., c. 93A, 13(1) (a). 
a Id. at § 3 (2) . 
9 G.L., c. 93A, 13. 
10 G.L., c. 176D, §2 (1972), formerly G.L.,·c. 176D, §3. 
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system in detennining what constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice. 
Although the Commissioner may be more familiar with details of the 
insurance industry, Chapter 176D reserves to the Supreme Judicial Court 
a broad power to review any report of the Commissioner which concludes 
that a challenged practice is not unfair or deceptive. If the Court dis-
agrees with the Commissioner's conclusion, it may enjoin the act or 
practice "notwithstanding such report of the commissioner."ll This power 
of broad judicial review demonstrates a clear legislative intent that the 
Court should have the final word in defining what constitutes an unfair 
or deceptive practice. Certainly where the act in controversy is as simple 
as the one involved in the Gordon case, it seems very doubtful that the 
specialized expertise of the Commissioner need be invoked. 
The Gordon decision could be relegated solely to cover conduct of 
insurance companies were it not for Justice Braucher's broad dictum to 
the effect that administrative procedure is required as to the acts or 
practices of any industry regulated by a state agency prior to seeking 
relief under Chapter 93A. Gordon is a dangerous decision--one reflective 
of the Court's reluctance to afford consumers effective private relief, and 
perhaps one susceptible only to legislative remedy. 
Subsequent to the Gordon decision, Chapter 176D of the General Laws 
was revised by Chapter 543 of the Acts of 1972. Under Section 9 of the 
old law the Commissioner of Insurance was given authority to hold hear-
ings, and, through the Attorney General, cause a petition to be filed in 
the Supreme Judicial Court to enjoin an unfair· or deceptive act or 
practice which was not specifically enumerated in the chapter. Perhaps 
it was because this authority was rarely used that the above provision 
was eradicated from the statutory scheme of Chapter 176D. The new 
chapter contains a comprehensive list of prohibited conduct, and the 
need for the old provision was thereby eliminated.12 
The new Chapter 176D should modify the myopic decision in Gordon. 
Section 7 pennits consumers to recover punitive damages up to twenty-
five percent of any claim in an action on an insurance policy if the court 
finds that the consumer has been damaged by a practice which violated 
the statute. Section 8 provides that "[n]o order of the commissioner under 
this chapter or order of a court to enforce the same shall in any way 
relieve or absolve any person affected by such order from any liability 
under any other laws of this commonwealth." A fair reading of these 
provisions suggests that the remedies afforded by Chapter 176D are not 
11 Id. at §9 (1972), formerly G.L., c. 176D, § 10. 
12 While it is not entirely clear that the claim of the plaintiff in Gordon would 
have been covered by the new provisions of Chapter 176D, it is conceivable that 
the act complained of may be characterized as a misrepresentation. It would 
appear that the provision which comes closest to covering the Gordon situation 
is the new §3(12) of c. 176D which applies §181 of c. 175 to prohibit any in-
surancecompany from making any "misleading representation in respe.ct to the 
terms . • . of any policy of insurance . . . in order to induce or which tends to 
induce [the insured] ... to exchange it for any other such policy .... " 
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exclusive, and that relief should be independently available under Chap-
ter 93A. 
The public remedies under the new chapter entitle the Commissioner 
to hold hearings on violations,13 to issue cease and desist orders,14 to 
suspend or revoke licenses and to impose fines. 15 The Supreme Judicial 
Court is vested with a broad power to review and affirm or modify the 
order of the commissioner.16 Further, the commissioner can promulgate 
regulations refining but not expanding upon the conduct proscribed by 
the new chapterP However, none of these remedies afford pecuniary 
relief directly to aggrieved consumers and the remedies under Chapter 
93A should therefore be independently available. 
I t should be noted that a consumer seeking a private remedy under 
Section 9 of Chapter 93A must establish a loss, a difficult burden in the 
case of some kinds of unfair and deceptive practices. A bill was recently 
filed to liberalize this requirement,18 but the General Court has thus far 
only provided a resolution calling for an investigation of the problem by 
the Judicial Counci1.19 
§1O.7. Unfair and deceptive practices: Inclusions; landlord and ten-
ant. Chapter 93A of the General Laws has been amended1 to clarify 
language under an existing provision which left in doubt the question of 
whether the prohibition against "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"2 
encompassed transactions involved in the rental and leasing of services 
and property, including realty, as well as the sale thereof.3 As a result 
of the change, tenants are now supplied with another potent weapon in 
their protective arsenal.4 
Under Section 9 of Chapter 93A a tenant or group of tenants similarly 
situated can recover actual pecuniary losses resulting from an unfair act 
or practice of a landlord, may seek injunctive relief, or pursue both 
remedies. At least thirty days prior to instituting such actions, the tenant 
must mail a written demand for relief to the landlord, "identifying the 
13 Acts of 1972, c.543, § 1, adding G.L., c. 176D, §6. The provisions of former 
§6 are substantially retained by the new section. 
14 Id., adding G.L., c. 176D, §7. The provisions of former §7 are substantially 
retained by the new section. 
15 Id. 
16 Id., adding G.L., c. 176D, §9. The new §9 is derived from former § 10. 
17 Id., adding G.L., c. 176D, §11. This section is new. 
18 H. 508 (1972). 
19 Resolves of 1972, c. 31, 
§l0.7. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 123, amending G.L., c. 93A, §l(b}. 
2 G.L., c. 93A, §2(a}. 
3 The prior law, by its terms, covered only the sale of such services and 
property. 
4 For other examples of legislation protective of tenants see, e.g., G.L., c. 239, 
§§9, 10, as amended by Acts of 1972, c. 23, §l (stay of proceedings for evictions 
without cause), and G.L., c. 111, §l27H (institution of rent receivership in cases 
where condition of premises violates standards of fitness for human habitation 
established under sanitary code or department of health standards). 
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claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or prac-
tice relied upon and the injury suffered .... "5 The landlord may make 
a written tender of settlement within thirty days of the receipt of the 
tenant's demand, and if such tender is made and rejected, the landlord 
may set up, by affidavit, the fact of tender and rejection and file it with 
the superior court. If, upon reviewing the circumstances, the court finds 
the amount of the tendered relief to have been reasonable, it may limit 
the tenant's recovery to that amount in any subsequent action.6 The 
method of relief provided by Section 9 avoids the more cumbersome 
procedure of rent receivership; however, it does not expressly permit the 
withholding of rent and can ultimately involve the expense and formality 
of a suit in superior court. 
At the time of this writing the Attorney General had not promulgated 
regulations dealing specifically with acts and practices in real estate 
transactions. They no doubt will be forthcoming. In the interim, certain 
existing regulations could cover such acts and practices. For example, 
regulations prohibiting advertising an apartment at one price when in 
actuality only a higher priced apartment is available might, by analogy, 
be applied to a similar real estate transaction. The same logic should 
hold true for the prohibition against the false or misleading description 
of premises. 
§1O.8. Unsafe products. The concern of consumers for improved 
product safety was echoed in the chambers of the General Court where 
several items of legislation were enacted in 1972 dealing with the regula-
tion of hazardous or potentially hazardous products. The most compre-
hensive of those enactments is Chapter 506 of the Acts of 1972 amend-
ing Chapter 94B of the General Laws by modifying the labeling re-
quirements of that chapter and further regulating the sale of unsafe 
products. 
By Section 1 of Chapter 506 the Commissioner of Public Health is 
given broad authority to take out of the marketplace any household 
substance including toys 
which the commissioner by regulation classifies as a 'banned hazard-
ous substance' on the basis of finding that notwithstanding caution-
ary labeling required under this chapter, the degree or nature of the 
hazard involved in the presence or use of the substance in house-
holds is such that the protection of the public health and safety can 
be adequately served only by keeping the substance out of the chan-
nels of commerce.1 (Emphasis added). 
The new statute introduces the term "misbranded hazardous sub-
stance," in the place of "misbranded package" in the old statute. It 
5 G.L., c. 93A, §9(3). A sample written demand for relief can be found in 
1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §8, Appendix I at 166-67. 
6 G.L'J c. 93A, §9 (3). 
§1O.8. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 506, §t, amending G.L., c. 94B, §§1 and 2(d). 
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further prescribes that the label on any hazardous substance that is not 
a "banned hazardous substance" and which is intended for use by chil-
dren must bear adequate directions for the protection of children from 
the hazard.2 Also, by Chapter 427 of the Acts of 1972,3 drugs which the 
United States Food and Drug Administration designates as "misbranded" 
will be given the equivalent designation under state law. 
The Director of the Food and Drug Division of the Department of 
Public Health or his inspector is given authority under Chapter 506 to 
detain or embargo any banned hazardous substance or any hazardous 
substance he finds or has probable cause to believe is misbranded.4 If 
the person responsible for such banned or misbranded hazardous sub-
stances does not voluntarily destroy them, the Director or his inspector 
may seek a libel for condemnation within thirty days of detention or 
embargo and an order for destruction.5 
The new Section 8 of Chapter 94B now provides for the mandatory 
repurchase of any banned hazardous substance sold by any manufacturer, 
distributor or dealer.6 Of particular significance to the consumer is the 
provision that: 
In the case of any article or substance sold at retail by a dealer, if 
the person who purchased it from the dealer returns it to him, the 
dealer shall refund the purchase price paid for it and reimburse him 
for any reasonable and necessary transportation charges incurred in 
its return.7 
While the above provision appears to be fair, there is no guarantee that 
a consumer will be warned that a product he has purchased is a banned 
hazardous substance. The power to warn the public of health dangers 
from hazardous substances is purely discretionary with the Commissioner 
of Public Health.8 A more effective measure would be to require the 
seller of a banned hazardous substance to notify the buyer of the danger, 
and also of his rights of resale. 
Chapter 94B imposes various penalties for noncompliance with its 
provisions. The new Section 4 imposes penalties for the failure to comply 
with Section 3 which prohibits certain acts in relation to misbranding. 
The new Section 6 imposes severe penalties on any person who obstructs 
an authorized search, under a valid search warrant, of premises where 
2 Id., amending G.L., c. 94B, § l. 
3 Amending G.L., c. 94, §187. 
4 Acts of 1972, c. 506, § 1, adding G.L., c. 94B, §5 (a). 
5 Id. 
6 The new §8 provides that "the term 'manufacturer' includes an importer for 
resale, and ... a dealer who sells at wholesale an article or substance shall with 
respect to that sale be considered the distributor of that article or substance." 
7 Acts of 1972, c. 506, §1 adding G.L., c. 94B, §8(c). 
8 Id., amending G.L., c. 94B, §9. The new §9 merely reiterates the old §8, 
substituting the words "possible danger to health" for the words "imminent 
danger to health." 
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a hazardous substance is kept or records showing the movement in com-
merce of any such substances. Section 21, which was only slightly 
amended,9 continues to impose strict liability on any person who himself 
or by his servant or agent, violates any provision of Sections 1 to 18 of 
Chapter 94B. 
In another recent enactment the legislature declared that by 1976, 
grass cutting machines sold in the Commonwealth must have safety de-
vices to protect users from objects ejected from the blade in accordance 
with regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Public Safety.1° 
Failure to install such a device will result in a fine of up to five hundred 
dollars.l1 
Animals were not omitted from the General Court's largesse. Eleven 
sections of Chapter 94 were repealed12 and new sections added to Chap-
ter 12813 all designed to provide labeling on commercial feeds (including 
pet foods) in terms of weight, brand, manufacturer, directions for use, 
precautions and nutritional contents. All such feeds must be registered 
prior to their sale. 14 Distribution of unlabeled, mislabeled or adulterated 
feed is prohibited, with both administrative enforcement and criminal 
penalties possible.15 In this respect, animals fare better than humans 
whose food need not bear labels with nutritional content-an anomaly, 
perhaps, since animals can't read. 
9 Acts of 1972, c. 506, §2. The amendment substituted a reference to §6 for 
a reference to §9. 
10 Acts of 1972, c. 429, adding G.L., c. 147, §56. 
11 Id. 
12 Acts of 1972, c. 365, §2, repealing §§225-235 of G.L., c. 94. 
13 Acts of 1972, c. 365, §3, amending G.L., c. 128, by inserting §§51-62. 
14 G.L., c. 128, §52. 
15 G.L., c. 128, §61. 
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